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Abstract 
 
How does firm value change in response to a minimum wage hike? This paper 
exploits the announcement of a big change in the UK minimum wage that was both 
totally unanticipated and free of uncertainty. The stock market response to this is 
examined in an event study setting. The analysis uncovers significant falls in the stock 
market value of low wage firms. In the light of this finding, the paper concludes by 
discussing magnitudes of response, including longer term modes of firm adjustment to 
the cost shock induced by the minimum wage hike. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since minimum wage floors were first introduced to labor markets around the 
world, a perennial research question of high relevance for labor market policy has 
been how firms adjust to wage cost increases brought about by increases in the 
minimum wage. The first port of call for much of the literature has been to study the 
labor demand response of firms, and this has at various points in time generated 
research and policy controversies about what minimum wage increases do to 
employment or unemployment.
1
 As evidence of employment losses from minimum 
wage hikes has proven elusive in a number of settings, a smaller body of research has 
placed a focus on looking for other margins of firm adjustment. Whilst there are many 
such margins, which may differ for firms operating in different sectors, some areas 
considered in research have been the scope to pass minimum wages on in terms of 
higher prices (e.g. Aaronson and French, 2007; Lemos, 2008), whether firms cut back 
on wage increases for other higher paid workers and so reduce wage inequality (e.g. 
Lee, 1999; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Dickens and Manning, 2004) and on 
whether minimum wage increases squeeze firm profitability (e.g. Draca, Machin and 
Van Reenen, 2011). 
 In this paper we study minimum wage effects on firm profitability in a 
different way from the direct before/after analysis of changes in accounting 
profitability that result from minimum wage changes. Instead we study the impact of 
                                                        
1
 Surveying the (mostly US time series) literature that studied data up to the late 1970s, Brown, Gilroy 
and Kohen (1982) concluded that minimum wages reduced teenage employment, but had less effect on 
adult employment. The next phase of research were the more micro-based studies of the 1990s, 
spearheaded by the Card and Krueger (1994) paper on fast food restaurants and Card and Krueger’s 
(1995) book, which both questioned the earlier findings and found no evidence of disemployment 
effects. The introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage in April 1999 also generated a number of 
pieces of research failing to find significant employment effects (see, inter alia, Machin, Manning and 
Rahman, 2003, Stewart, 2002, 2004, or Dolton, Bondibene and Stops, 2015). In the US there has 
recently been another revival of research on minimum wage effects, with some focus on geography and 
differences across state borders. As before this is proving controversial on whether or not minimum 
wages reduce employment (see, inter alia, Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010 and 2016, Meer and West, 
2016, or Neumark, Salas and Wascher, 2014). 
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the announcement of a minimum wage change on the stock market value of firms. 
This approach has been adopted in a couple of studies before, first by Card and 
Krueger (1995) who studied twenty three events in the US between 1987 and 1989 
that eventually led to minimum wage increases in 1990 and 1991, and by Pacheco and 
Naiker (2006) who undertook an event study looking at changes in shareholder values 
following a significant reform to the youth minimum wage in New Zealand. Neither 
of these studies delivers very clear results, primarily because the nature of the ‘events’ 
that were examined do not allow for a clean event-study. Such a study would require a 
completely unexpected minimum wage change that had no uncertainty attached to its 
introduction. To take one example from Card and Krueger, on June 13, 1989 
President Bush vetoed a minimum wage rise. The stock market reaction to this event 
shows no significant effect on firm value. But as Card and Krueger note, it is difficult 
to know whether this veto conveyed new information to the market, since the White 
House had promised to veto the bill when it was first passed by the House three 
months earlier. And if it did contain new information, how did it change the 
probability of a minimum wage change? 
The event studied in this paper is able to significantly improve upon such 
concerns. A completely unanticipated and sizable change in the UK minimum wage 
system was announced in the newly elected Conservative government’s emergency 
budget that was called after its election to power in May 2015. The Chancellor 
George Osborne announced that the UK government would introduce a new National 
Living Wage (NLW) of £7.20 per hour for workers aged 25 and over. Not only was 
this announcement from a right of centre government that has traditionally been 
against minimum wages, it was also totally unexpected, with other government 
ministers and the body which advises the government on minimum wages (the Low 
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Pay Commission) not knowing that it would occur.
2
 Thus the major advantage of our 
study compared to the other stock market reaction research in this area is that the 
announcement we study was completely unanticipated. 
 The event study approach has been very widely used in finance (see Kothari 
and Warner, 2008, or MacKinlay, 1997), but it has also been used by labor 
economists in several settings, most notably as a means of studying the effects of 
unions on firm performance.
3
 The seminal paper studying union effects on stock 
market values was by Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) whose event study of union 
representation elections uncovered evidence of a negative effect of union wins on the 
equity value of US firms. Subsequently, Bronars and Deere (1990) uncovered similar 
effects while Lee and Mas (2012) used a much larger sample and wider time window 
to find a longer run impact of unions on firm value. These union papers usefully 
inform the research design we adopt in our event study, but in the different setting of 
minimum wage changes. 
 In this paper, the differential stock market response of employers of minimum 
wage workers is compared to that of employers of higher wage workers in an event 
study setting looking at minute-by-minute changes surrounding the announcement 
and at cumulative abnormal returns in the days before and after the announcement. 
There is evidence of significant falls in the stock market value of low wage firms. 
Within a day of the budget, firm values were around 1.3 percent lower for the 
employers of minimum wage labor and ended up stabilizing around 2 to 3 percent 
lower after five days. Much of this adjustment was rapid and had happened within a 
couple of days. We present a simple calibration to give a sense of how the fall in firm 
                                                        
2
 The BBC News reported that day as follows: “In a surprise announcement at the end of his speech, he 
said workers aged over 25 would be entitled to a "national living wage" from next April, to soften the 
impact of in-work benefit cuts.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33437115 
3
 Another example of event studies in labor economics is Farber and Hallock’s (2009) analysis of the 
stock market value effects of job loss announcements. 
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value, and hence the path of future profits, compares to the size of the wage cost 
shock that will be induced by the announcement. In the light of this, the paper 
concludes by discussing these magnitudes of response in terms of longer term modes 
of firm adjustment to the cost shock induced by the minimum wage hike. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the 
relationship between minimum wages and profitability is first considered, followed by 
a discussion of the system of minimum wages that operates in the UK and then how 
this has altered following the introduction of the new National Living Wage. Section 
3 describes the data and event study methodology.  The results are discussed in 
Section 4, and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Minimum Wages, Profitability and the New National Living Wage 
Minimum Wages and Profitability 
For a competitive profit maximizing firm employing L workers at wage rate W, using 
other factors of production at price R and selling its output at price P, profits are 
maximized at Π(W, R, P). For such a firm, the derivative of the profit function with 
respect to the wage rate is ∂Π/∂W = -L(W,R,P), the negative of the demand for labor 
and the second derivative is ∂2Π/∂W2 = -∂L/∂W. The introduction of a minimum 
wage at a level M, above the prevailing wage W, reduces firm profits by
.  
Following Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), the profit reduction from a minimum 
wage increase can be approximated as: 
 
(1) 
where ΔW = M – W.  
P)R,Π(M,P)R,Π(W,ΔΠ 
2W)(
W
L
2
1
 W LΔΠ 



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The first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the wage bill effect on profits (
) and the second can be thought of as the labor demand ( ) effect 
on profits. Equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
(2) 
where < 0 is the elasticity of labor demand. 
 Equation (2) offers one way of thinking about the profit response of a firm to a 
minimum wage hike. If there is “no behavioral response”, which in this setting means 
no impact on labor demand, the second order effect in (2), ( ), is zero. The 
fall of profits that would result from the imposition of a minimum wage M is then 
equal to the proportionate change in the wage multiplied by the wage bill.  
If adjustment can occur, then the labor demand effect in the second term is 
non-zero. Thus the profit loss can be ameliorated to the extent that firms can 
substitute away from low-wage workers into other factors (e.g. capital). One 
interesting question is the speed at which such adjustment could occur. In the event 
study setting of the empirical work in this paper, this is particularly interesting when 
one attempts to gauge the size of the profit reduction that can result from a change in 
market value (which is the present discounted value of firm profits).
4
 
In (2) the behavioral response is in terms of employment, but in other models 
mitigation of the cost shock can arise in different ways. In Aaronson and French 
(2007), for example, firms have constant marginal costs and thus a horizontal supply 
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 See also Abowd’s (1989) classic study of union wage increases and firm performance. Abowd 
estimates a version of equation (2) examining the effects of unanticipated increases in the wage bill 
(which he defines as union wealth) on the present discounted value of profits as reflected in changes in 
stock market values ( or shareholder wealth). Interestingly, the findings are unable to reject the simple 
no behavioral response model where the second order effect is zero. 
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curve and so, irrespective of the nature of competition in the product market, the 
minimum wage increase is passed on entirely to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. In putty-clay models (like Aaronson, French and Sorkin, forthcoming) the 
same is true.
5
 As Aaronson (2001) discusses, whilst the perfectly competitive model 
implies full-shifting of cost shocks through to prices, more generally the degree of 
shifting depends on a number of factors. These include the demand elasticity, the 
responsiveness of marginal cost to output and the degree of product market 
competition. Some other alternatives to adjusting prices that enable the firm to negate 
the negative impact on profits include compression of the internal wage structure, 
efficiency wages/productivity improvements and conventional labor demand 
responses (see, for example, Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska, 2015). 
Equation (2) also usefully illustrates the inverse relationship between a firm’s 
initial wage and the profit change. It shows that, the lower the initial wage, then the 
greater the fall in profits associated with the imposition of a minimum wage. This 
logic underpins what we do in our empirical work where we focus on the stock 
market response of employers of minimum wage workers in an event study setting. 
The means by which we define firms that employ minimum wage workers is 
considered in Section 3 of the paper where we also describe the data that we use. 
Minimum Wage Setting in the UK 
 A National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced to the UK labor market in 
April 1999. Prior to that, minimum wages did not play a role in wage determination as 
the system that used to operate (the Wages Councils who set sectoral minima in low 
wage sectors, only covering about 10 percent of UK workers) had been abolished by 
the Conservative government in 1993 (Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999).  
                                                        
5
 See Sorkin (2015) who emphasises the distinction between modes of adjustment in the short and long 
run. Clemens and Wither (2014) also document that minimum wages take some time to be reflected in 
employment levels 
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 The rate at which the National Minimum Wage was introduced was 
determined by a body set up by the Labour government which was elected in May 
1997. The Low Pay Commission (LPC) was instituted as an advisory body by the 
National Minimum Wage Act of 1998. The LPC has nine Commissioners, three of 
which are from business, three of which are from employee representation groups, 
and three are members who are independent from the social partners. These last three 
are the Chair and two academics who are experts in labor economics and industrial 
relations.  
The LPC remit is set by the government each spring, with a main focus on 
coming up with evidence-based recommendations on the main adult minimum wage 
rate and the associated age-specific minima.  The LPC assesses evidence from a wide 
range of sources (e.g. academic research, site visits, an annual consultation procedure 
with oral evidence taken from a wide range of stakeholders). It then makes 
recommendations in a report submitted to government in February, to which the 
government responds on acceptance or rejection of the recommendations, and then if 
accepted (as the main adult rate always has been since introduction) the NMW is 
uprated on October 1
st
.
6
  
 In April 1999 the National Minimum Wage was first introduced at a rate of 
£3.60 per hour for workers aged over 21, together with a youth development rate at 
£3.00 per hour for 18-21 year olds. Through time more rates have been introduced: in 
2004 a minimum wage for 16-17 year olds was introduced, and an apprentice 
minimum wage in 2010. Also in 2010 the adult rate was extended to 21 year olds, so 
that by 2015 there were four rates in operation: the adult minimum wage rate (now for 
those aged 21 and over) which had reached £6.70 by October 2015; the youth 
                                                        
6
 For more detail on the functioning of the LPC see Brown (2002), Butcher (2012) and Metcalf (1999, 
2002). 
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development rate for 18-20 year olds of £5.30; the rate for 16-17 year olds of £3.87; 
and the apprentice rate of £3.30.
7
 
In many quarters, the operation of the LPC has been deemed a success. The 
Institute of Government’s 2010 polling of 159 members of the Political Studies 
Association rated the NMW as the most successful government policy of the previous 
thirty years.
8
 This reflects the evidence-based approach leading to little in the way of 
employment losses from the NMW, and the independence of the LPC in being able to 
make its deliberations largely free from political intervention. 
The New National Living Wage 
 After being in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats as the UK 
government in power between May 2010 and 2015, the Conservative party was 
elected outright in the May 2015 election. It called an emergency budget for July 8 
2015 and in this budget the Chancellor George Osborne made the completely 
unexpected announcement of introducing a new National Living Wage that would 
raise the NMW for age 25 year olds and older workers by 50 pence from April 2016. 
The main reason for this was to offset the tax credit cuts that the Chancellor 
introduced in the budget in his strong programme of austerity cuts. In the Appendix 
we outline all the measures announced in the budget statement. There were a number 
of changes to personal taxation and to the taxation of dividends and corporate profits. 
The only changes other than the NLW that were focused on particular businesses 
were a rise in insurance premium tax and reform of the taxation of banks – neither of 
                                                        
7
 The UK government has almost always accepted the LPC’s recommendations on rates. This has 
always been true for the recommendations adult, development and 16-17 year old rates. The 
recommendation on apprentice rates has twice been met with a government instituted change: first in 
2011 when the LPC recommended a freeze of the rate but government intervened to increase it by 5 
pence; then more markedly in 2015 when the LPC recommended raising the rate by 7 pence from 
£2.73 to £2.80 as the business secretary pushed the rate a further 50 pence up to £3.30. 
8
 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11896971. 
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which are relevant for our study. This gives us confidence that no other announcement 
in the budget had a significant impact on low-wage firms in particular. 
 From a political economy perspective, this is a striking and radical 
intervention. It comes from a political party that has traditionally been strongly 
against minimum wages and, indeed, which strongly opposed the introduction of the 
NMW in the first place. The very poor real wage performance of most workers in the 
UK labor market since 2008 (when median real wages have fallen by around 10 
percent, but such falls are seen across most of the wage distribution as well) has 
altered this standpoint to some extent.
9
 It is true that all of the main UK political 
parties (including the Conservatives) have recognised that minimum wages are both 
popular amongst the general public and that they can play a role in raising wages (and 
by association living standards).
10
 
 The surprise of the budget announcement and the size of the wage shock is 
what we exploit in our event study of the impact on the stock market value of firms.
11
 
The 50 pence NLW supplement on adult minimum wages came as a complete 
surprise to the market. The Chancellor also introduced a target level for the adult 
minimum wage of £9 per hour to be reached by 2020. This was also news to the stock 
market, as the Conservative Manifesto published a month before the May 2015 
election was clear in the aspiration of reaching £8 per hour by that date.  
The introduction of the NLW also alters the role of the LPC in its future 
deliberations, as it now has a target to work to. In practical terms the government 
                                                        
9
 See Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014) and Gregg, Machin and Fernandez-Salgado (2014) for more 
detail on the nature of real wage falls in the UK labor market. 
10
 On the popularity of the UK minimum wage, a 2014 Gallup poll reported that 66 percent of those 
polled were in favour of increasing the minimum wage. 
11
 In addition to being unanticipated, we noted earlier that a key additional requirement for a successful 
event study, particularly when trying to evaluate the size of any estimated effect, is that there be no 
uncertainty over the introduction of the new minimum wage. The announcement considered in this 
paper satisfies that requirement because the 1998 National Minimum Wage Act gives government 
ministers the power to set the minimum wage without reference to the LPC. The government 
confirmed in writing to the LPC on budget day that such an order would be made. 
10 
 
intervention has also effectively introduced a new age band into the structure of 
minimum wages that operate for low wage workers in the UK. This is shown in Table 
1 where the new structure of minimum wage rates that will apply from 2016 is 
compared to those of 2014 and 2015. 
 The new NLW also offers an ‘experiment’ not made possible by previous 
increases in the minimum wage coming from earlier  LPC recommendations. In due 
course, it will be interesting to study the employment and other economic effects of 
this big increase, of 10.8 percent compared to the £6.50 rate at the time of the 
announcement, or of 7.5 percent compared to the already accepted LPC rate of £6.70 
that was made effective after the budget in October 2015. By 2020, the targeted 
minimum wage of £9 is 12.5 percent higher than the £8 level that had previously been 
suggested. 
 As a result of the minimum wage changes and 2020 target, the number of 
workers in the UK labor market who are covered by the minimum is expected to rise 
significantly. Figure 1 shows actual coverage from 1999 to 2014 and expected 
coverage from 2015 onwards (defined as the number of workers paid at or below the 
relevant minimum and up to 5 pence above). There is a significant increase resulting 
from the change. In 2015, before the change, the number of covered workers had risen 
gradually to reach 1.6 million. Afterwards, due to the new NLW of April 2016 and the 
2020 target, there is a sharp increase, straight away jumping to over 2.5 million, and 
reaching 3.8 million by 2020. 
 
 
3. Data and Modelling Approach 
Data 
11 
 
The principal sample frame of firms for our analysis is made up of the constituents of 
the FTSE All-Share Index. This index comprises eligible companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange main market that pass screenings for liquidity and 
investability. The index captures 98 percent of the UK’s market capitalization. We 
exclude from our analysis all investment trusts and private equity funds, giving a final 
set of 442 firms, with a mean (median) market capitalization of £3.1bn (£599mn).  
We have daily prices, total returns and volume from Datastream. We also 
extract daily data on market capitalization, dividend yield and the price-book ratio. 
Trade-level data for the announcement date are taken from Bloomberg. These data 
contain the price, volume and exact time of every trade during the official trading day 
(8am to 4.30pm). We use this data to compute the volume-weighted price for each 
stock by minute of the trading day. 
Treatment Firms 
To estimate the effect of the increase of the minimum wage on market values, 
we need to identify a subset of firms from the entire sample of 442 firms that are 
exposed to the treatment. Our principal results follow the approach of Draca, Machin 
and Van Reenen (2011) by using accounting information on the average wage of the 
firm to sort firms. The annual accounts report the total wage and salary costs for the 
firm and the average number of employees. This gives us a measure of the average 
annual wage per employee. Since the new minimum wage is set at £7.20, a worker 
who is employed full-year full-time would earn £14,976.  
We therefore first identify the quoted firms in our sample who are expected to 
be affected by the minimum wage announcement on the basis of their average wage 
per employee being less than £15,000 per year. The strength of this identification 
approach depends on the extent to which minimum wage workers are concentrated in 
12 
 
firms at the lower end of the wage distribution. Unfortunately, firms are not required 
to report any information on the distribution of wages within the firm, only the 
average wage. We also require that the firm has a majority of its employees based in 
the UK. Some of the low average wage firms are predominantly operating in low-
wage economies, but have chosen to list on the London stock exchange. Clearly these 
firms are not affected by the UK minimum wage. Our final sample of NMW firms 
comprises the twenty companies that are listed (grouped by sector) in the Appendix. 
Together, these 20 firms employ over 600,000 workers. 
To assess the usefulness of the identification approach we adopt, we study a 
different data source looking at the segregation of wages across firms in the UK using 
the 2013 cross-section of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the 
Annual Business Survey (ABS). These are matched worker-firm level data that allows 
us to look at within-firm wage distributions (for a one percent sample of workers) and 
explore the association between average wages and the intensity of low-wage 
workers. We have a sample of 63,770 workers employed in the private sector who can 
be matched to firm-level data (7,803 firms) that includes the average wage per 
employee.  
We follow the Low Pay Commission procedure of defining a minimum wage 
worker as any worker who receives an hourly wage (excluding overtime) that is up to 
five pence above the minimum wage effective at the time of the survey (April 2013). 
Overall, 6.2 percent of our sample are minimum wage workers. This is very similar to 
the 7 percent figure reported for all private sector workers in the UK in the 2014 Low 
Pay Commission report (page 22). Our final restriction is that firms must employ at 
13 
 
least 100 workers and have an average wage of at least £5,000.
12
 These two sample 
restrictions reduce our sample to 60,990 workers (and 5,850 firms), but the share of 
minimum-wage jobs remains at 6.2 percent.  
In Figure 2, we plot the proportion of minimum-wage workers in a firm 
against the firm’s average annual wage for those firms with an average wage below 
£30,000 (40,046 workers in 3,684 firms). We split the sample into average wage 
ventiles, with a sample of 184 firms in each bin. There is clearly a strong decline in 
the proportion of minimum-wage workers as the average wage rises. Only for those 
bins to the left of the £15,000 cutoff are at least 10 percent of the workforce on the 
minimum wage. On average, 21 percent of workers in firms with an average wage of 
less than £15,000 are minimum-wage workers.  Alternatively, one can note that 75 
percent of minimum-wage workers work in firms that have average annual wages of 
less than £15,000.  
These figures probably underestimate the impact of the minimum wage on our 
treatment group of 20 firms, because they reflect the average share of minimum-wage 
workers across all industries. Our treatment group however is heavily focused on two 
particular industries, namely Retail Trade and Accommodation and Food Service 
activities. As the second row of Table 2 shows, if we further restrict the ASHE/ABS 
sample to focus on these two industries, 26.0 percent of workers in firms with an 
average wage of less than £15,000 are minimum-wage workers.  
Event Study Methodology 
We follow the by now standard approach in the finance literature to estimate 
the effect of the minimum wage change on a firm’s equity value. We compute the 
                                                        
12
 We do this only to ensure that the ASHE/ABS sample of firms are more similar to the firms in the 
FTSE All-Share index, which naturally tend to be larger employers. Note that amongst the low-wage 
firms in our treatment sample, none would be eliminated on the basis of these two restrictions. 
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abnormal return as the difference between a stock’s actual return and the expected 
return. For firm i at time t, the abnormal return is simply: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡] (3) 
where rit is the actual realized return and is E[rit|Xt] is the expected return, with Xt 
denoting the information set at time t.  
We consider a number of alternative specifications for 𝐸[𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡]. Perhaps the 
most common approach is to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate 
the sensitivity of the ith firm’s return to a market index (i.e. 𝑋𝑡 is the market return) 
and use the predicted values as an estimate of the expected return. This approach is 
adopted by Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Card and Krueger (1995) and Lee and 
Mas (2012). To implement this, we estimate a daily return model of the form: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4) 
where rmt is the return on the equal-weighted FTSE All Share index (i.e. the 442 
companies excluding investment trusts and private equity funds). The market model is 
estimated over a twelve-month period up to the 15
th
 April 2015, which is 60 days 
prior to the minimum wage announcement. The abnormal return from the CAPM 
model is then simply: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) (5) 
It is well-known however that the cross-section of stock returns can be 
predicted by more than simply the market return (Fama and French, 1992). We 
therefore also present results using a four-factor model for expected returns that 
includes the market return, a size return based on market capitalization, a value return 
based on dividend yield and a momentum return.
13
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 For the four-factor model, we estimate each factor return by allocating all stocks in the FTSE All-
Share index (excluding investment trusts) into (a) a large, medium and small-cap portfolio based on the 
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One further factor that could affect our results is that, as we have already 
shown, firms with sizeable minimum wage exposure tend to be heavily distributed in 
certain industries that employ more low wage workers such as retail, hotels, 
restaurants and bars. Evidence suggests that stock returns have an important industry 
component (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Fama and French, 1997) and if, by 
chance, these particular industries experienced abnormal returns relative to the market 
since the announcement date for reasons unrelated to the minimum wage, we would 
ascribe those returns to the minimum wage announcement. The expected return 
definition used above will not account for this. We therefore also construct two-digit 
SIC industry returns (excluding the minimum wage firms themselves) and use these 
as our measure of expected returns. So in our main results we consider estimates of 
abnormal returns from three alternative models: (1) the CAPM, (2) a four-factor 
model and (3) a 2-digit industry model. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we discuss the results of our analysis. We begin by presenting minute- 
by-minute evidence to demonstrate the strong reaction of our minimum wage sample 
to the exact announcement time of the minimum wage increase. We then examine the 
subsequent daily abnormal returns. Finally we present evidence from a regression 
model that suggests a significant ability of the market to isolate minimum wage firms 
from other, arguably similar, firms. 
Intra-day Announcement Effects 
                                                                                                                                                              
30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile rank on the previous trading day, (b) a high, medium and low dividend yield 
portfolio based on the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile rank on the previous trading day and (c) a high, medium 
and low momentum portfolio based on the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile rank on the previous trading day of 
returns over the period 126-21 days prior to the ranking. We then generate daily factor returns by 
taking the difference between the two extreme portfolios for each factor. See Dube, Kaplan and Naidu 
(2011) for another example of an event study using factor models. 
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer began the budget statement at 12:33 on July 
8
th
. At 13:35, he announced the decision to raise the minimum wage, one hour and 
two minutes into the speech. He concluded the speech four minutes later, at 13:39. 
We can therefore exploit the intra-day price change in our sample to examine whether 
there was any difference in returns between the NMW firms and the non-NMW firms 
prior to the announcement time (13:35) and whether there was a subsequent 
divergence. We have minute-by-minute data on the trade price and volume traded of 
each stock. We present results for both the equal-weighted index of NMW firms and a 
value-weighted index that accounts for the very different trading volumes that are 
present in the intra-day data. 
To motivate the analysis, Figure 3 shows minute-by-minute share price moves 
for three of our low wage firms from the market open on budget day to 24 hours after 
the NLW announcement. The three firms are a retail firm (Home Retail Group), a pub 
group (JD Wetherspoon) and a hospitality firm (The Restaurant Group). In all three 
cases, there is a marked dramatic drop in their share prices at the precise time that the 
minimum wage announcement was made. The initial drop within half an hour was of 
the order of 2-3 percent and was broadly sustained for the rest of the trading day.  On 
market opening at 8:00 AM the next day, the pub group JD Wetherspoon took another 
hit dropping a further 2 percent, presumably as the market had more time overnight to 
absorb and assess the information contained in the announcement. 
Analysis of the whole sample of NMW firms is provided in Table 3. Panel A 
gives the minute-by-minute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR (X, Y)) for the NMW 
stocks from the time of announcement (X = A) over the subsequent Y minutes. In 
Panel B we report the pre-announcement returns (as far back as 24 hours before). The 
abnormal returns are calculated for a market model (i.e. adjusting returns for the 
17 
 
overall market return over the same period) and for the two-digit industry model. The 
first two columns of results use equal-weighting, whilst the final two columns are 
value-weighted. Figure 4 displays the cumulative raw returns to the NMW and non-
NMW stocks from the beginning of the trading day to 24-hours after the 
announcement.
14
  
For the pre-announcement effects, there are two key points. First, there was 
essentially no trend in the market in the hours prior to the budget and no significant 
difference between the NMW and non-NMW stocks. Second, all of the budget 
announcements prior to the minimum wage announcement had very little effect on 
market prices and almost no effect on the relative performance of the two groups of 
firms. This is consistent with the evidence in Section 2 that other announcements in 
the budget were not directed at low-wage firms in particular. 
From 13:35 onward, the picture became very different. There was a sharp fall 
in the price of NMW stocks. One hour on from the announcement, the NMW firms on 
average experienced a fall of as much as 69bp relative to the market on an equal-
weighted basis, and 176bp on a value-weighted basis.
15
 Although these effects 
weaken as the trading day finished, all observations on the average abnormal returns 
of the NMW firms are negative from the announcement time. Moreover, on market 
opening the day after budget day, the gap significantly widens again as Figure 4 
makes very clear, so that 24 hours after the NLW announcement the fall in cumulative 
abnormal returns is around 1.3 percent. Overall, we take this as strong evidence that 
the decline in NMW prices relative to non-NMW prices occurred as a direct result of 
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 The gap between the two - the abnormal return - with associated 95 percent confidence intervals is 
shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
15
 Note that the smaller equal-weighted as compared to value-weighted returns reflect the fact that two 
very small firms in our NMW sample (Game Digital and Card Factory) had price gains during the 
afternoon on very small trading volumes. 
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the minimum wage announcement and was not as a consequence of other Budget 
changes (or indeed other events in the market).
16
  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Having demonstrated an intra-day response to the minimum wage 
announcement, we now turn to consider daily cumulative abnormal returns from the 
announcement day onward. We compute these equal-weighted cumulative abnormal 
returns from day X to day Y as CAR(X, Y) = ∑ ARit
t=Y
t=X . So for example denoting X=A 
as announcement time, CAR(A, 10) measures the cumulative abnormal return on the 
NMW stocks for the post-announcement part of Budget day and the first ten trading 
days from then. We use three expected return models: (1) the CAPM model, (2) a 4-
factor model and (3) a two-digit industry-matched model.  
Figure 5 plots the CAR (using the industry-matched model for returns) with 
associated 95 percent confidence intervals for the 10 days either side of the 
announcement.
17
 We study daily returns for a 10-day window since the announcement 
is clear and public, so we would expect the market to re-price reasonably fast. Longer 
horizons are increasingly likely to bring in other events not related to the NLW that 
may shift abnormal returns for treatment firms. We do however comment below on 
estimated CARs for up to three months after the announcement.  
The decline over the announcement day and the following day, CAR(A, 1), is 
in the range -1.4 to -1.7 percent, depending on the expected return model we adopt. 
Over the five-day period, the decline is between -2.1 percent and -3.0 percent. At this 
point, the decline seems to have stabilized, since there is at most an additional 20bp 
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 Figure A2 of the Appendix shows a placebo-type experiment by plotting the equal-weighted 
abnormal returns for the NMW firms for every 24-hour period (measured from 13:35 to 13:34 on the 
subsequent day) from 1st May up to and including the budget day (47 observations).  It shows the 
decline observed after the NLW announcement at -1.30% was by far the largest abnormal return 
observed across all 47 observations (the rest are mostly clustered in the ± 0.5% range).  
17
 The mean CARs from the three expected return models are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
19 
 
decline over the subsequent five days. This suggests that the market reacted quickly to 
the announcement, with around one-half to three-quarters of the adjustment occurring 
by the end of the first-day after the Budget. All the estimated negative cumulative 
returns are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. 
As already noted, other events may start to impact the estimated CARs as the 
time window is extended further. That said, when we did widen the window and 
estimate a twenty- and sixty-day CAR, we obtained estimates (and associated 
standard errors) of -2.919 (1.884) and -3.968 (3.755) for the industry-matched model. 
The significantly reduced precision of these estimates is not at all surprising, but the 
magnitude does show that the significant fall experienced within the first few days of 
the announcement appears to be permanent.  
Possible Small Sample Issues 
As with other event studies, small sample issues may lead to possible biases. 
The first concerns the relatively small number of firms in the treatment group and the 
volatility of returns for some of the less traded firms. To consider this, we have 
therefore also estimated CARs for the median firm at each horizon and by trimming 
the two highest and lowest CARs within the sample of twenty firms in the same way 
as before. The results for the five-day horizon are reported in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. All these alternative approaches continue to show significantly negative 
effects – though the point estimates are somewhat less negative in general. We also 
find that 15 of the 20 firms in the NMW portfolio have a negative abnormal return 
five-days after the announcement (regardless of expected return model). Using 18 
months of pre-announcement data, we find that for this sample of 20 firms, such a 
20 
 
large number of negative returns across the portfolio lies outside the 95 percent 
empirical confidence interval.
18
 
Regression Based Analysis 
 In a final analysis of the returns data, we examine the cross-section of all post-
announcement abnormal returns for the full sample of 442 firms. We are interested 
primarily here in whether there is evidence to suggest that the market was able to 
accurately identify the firms most at risk from the minimum wage rise and whether 
our identification approach to minimum-wage firms is plausible given the market 
response. 
 Table 4 reports some regression results for this cross-section of returns for the 
five-days following the announcement (results that prove qualitatively similar for ten-
day returns are given in Appendix Table A3). We use the CAPM model to estimate 
expected returns, but the results are robust to using any of the alternative return 
models considered before. In column (1) we simply report the coefficient on a dummy 
if the firm was in our NMW sample. The coefficient of -2.131 on this dummy is of 
course equal to the mean abnormal return after five-days we reported earlier (see 
Figure 5 and Appendix Table A1). In column (2) we additionally add controls for 2-
digit industry, market-capitalization size quintile and pre-announcement returns. 
These controls marginally increase the size of the estimated negative effect for the 
NMW firms to -2.331.
19
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 A second possible issue is that the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns may not be normally 
distributed. We therefore also undertook a non-parametric analysis where we estimated CARs in an 
estimation window that predates the NLW announcement. As one example, we estimated five-day 
industry-matched CARs based on daily data from September 2013 through April 2015 and considered 
their distributions. The 5th percentile CAR was -1.59 and the 95th percentile CAR was +1.73; the 1st 
percentile was -2.67 and the 99th percentile +2.34. Our estimated CAR of -3.047 is clearly more 
negative than the 99
th
 percentile (with an empirical p-value of 0.002). 
19
 Adding additional controls to this specification - (i) dividends per share, (ii) assets per share, (iii) 
price-book ratio, (iv) sales per worker and (v) return on equity – resulted in a very similar coefficient 
(standard error) of -2.477 (0.974). 
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 In the subsequent three columns, we examine the extent to which the market 
reaction was discriminating. In column (3) we consider whether the negative 
cumulative returns for the NMW sample are merely a result of a more general decline 
for lower-wage firms. Since we use the cutoff of less than £15,000 average wage to 
identify the NMW firms, we consider whether firms in the £15-20k, £20-25k and £25-
30k average wage bracket experienced any similar pattern (with £30k+ being the 
omitted group). There is no evidence to support this idea, suggesting that the market 
focused closely on the lowest-wage firms.  
In column (4) we divide the NMW sample into two equal-sized groups of 10 
firms. One group, termed NMW High Wage Bill Shock, are those firms in which the 
wage bill (as a fraction of total costs) is above the median, and the second group, 
NMW Low Wage Bill Shock, are those for which it is below the median. Assuming 
all our firms are hit by the same percentage wage bill increase, this should be more 
problematic for those firms in which wages are a larger share of costs. So we would 
expect the cumulative abnormal returns to be more negative for the NMW High Wage 
Bill Shock group, and this is exactly what we find – the magnitudes are quite different 
in numerical terms and the difference is significant at the 7% level. 
In the final column of the Table we consider variations in the stock market 
response for firms with different degrees of market power. To do so, we therefore 
calculated the gross profit margin for each of our 20 NMW firms (using the average 
over the prior three years) to generate a Lerner Index. We then divided the NMW 
sample into two equal-sized groups of 10 firms depending on whether they have a 
high or low Lerner Index. The results show that the abnormal returns were more 
negative for those facing a more competitive environment. This is in line with the 
notion that firms with more market power see smaller stock market responses because 
22 
 
they have greater scope to absorb the wage cost shock by means of one of the possible 
adjustments we discussed earlier (we return to this issue again below).
20
 
Gauging the Impact on Profitability 
Finally we turn to an analysis of the magnitude of the estimates that we have 
obtained, considering their plausibility in terms of the implied profit effect in the light 
of the model of Section 2 which allows for a behavioral response that can act to 
mitigate the wage bill shock over time. As has already been noted, the mitigation can 
be enabled through a variety of possible adjustments, including passing on the cost 
shock to consumers through higher prices, by reductions in non-wage compensation, 
productivity or service quality improvements, wage compression within the firm and 
substitution of other factors for low wage labor. 
To begin with, consider the sample of firms that have an average wage of less 
than £15,000 in the matched worker-firm data discussed in Section 3. We noted above 
that for the two principal industries in our equity sample, 26 percent of workers in 
these firms are minimum-wage workers. To evaluate the impact of a minimum-wage 
hike for these firms, we start by noting that for the low-wage firms in these industries, 
minimum-wage workers account for 21 percent of the wage bill. This of course is 
lower than their share of employment since they are by definition the lowest paid 
workers in the firm. So the simple direct effect of increasing the minimum wage by 10 
percent for these workers would generate a wage bill rise of 2.1 percent.  
But this calculation ignores two additional effects. First, all workers currently 
above the minimum wage but who would fall below the new minimum wage, must 
have their wages raised to at least the new minimum. 27 percent of workers are in this 
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 For 299 of our 442 firms we were also able to look at a minimum wage exposure variable when we 
were able to match to our firms from the ASHE and ABS data described above. The results are shown 
in Appendix Table A4 and overall reconfirm the pattern of results that we obtained from the larger 
sample. 
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group, and to raise their wages at least to the new minimum adds an additional 1.3 
percent to the wage bill, giving an overall increase of 3.4 percent. Second, it is usually 
assumed that workers seek to protect their relativities following a minimum wage 
increase.
21
 A simple method of capturing this is to assume that workers on the old 
minimum wage get the full 10 percent increase and that all workers within 20 percent 
of the old minimum receive some wage increase on a smoothly-sliding scale that 
maintains wage rank order, places everyone at least at the new minimum and tapers 
the minimum wage effect to vanish for all workers with wages already above 10 
percent of the new minimum. This gives a total wage bill increase of 4.1 percent. We 
would argue that this suggests a fairly tight bound on the wage bill effect of the 
increase, for the average firm in our sample, to be between 3 and 4 percent.  
How reasonable is this calculation? Perhaps the best evidence comes directly 
from one of the firms in our NMW sample. Next plc (a large clothes retailer) released 
its half-yearly report in September 2015. They provided a detailed calculation of the 
impact of the NLW on their wage bill. By 2020, the firm estimated that the wage bill 
would be £27m higher as a result of paying the NLW (including the associated costs 
of maintaining relativities) on a total wage bill of £720m, or 3.8 percent.  
Table 5 calibrates the impact of this scale of wage bill shock on firm profits. 
We use data from the last three annual reports of the 20 firms in our equity sample. 
All these reports predate the minimum wage announcement. We normalize sales to be 
100 and compute the average for each firm of the wage bill and pre-tax profits. The 
figures in column (1) report the baseline. On average, the wage bill is equal to 18.6 
percent of total sales and the pre-tax profit equals 6.0 percent. This is a relatively low 
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 This indirect effect is often termed a spillover or ‘ripple’ effect. Dube, Galiano and Leonard (2015) 
use payroll data from an individual firm in the US to suggest that this ripple effect is observed for 
workers earning up to 15 percent above a newly implemented Federal minimum wage. For other work 
on spillovers based on individual-level microdata see Autor, Manning and Smith (2016) for the US or 
Dickens and Manning (2004) for the UK. 
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profit margin, though is common for firms in these sectors. We focus on pre-tax 
profits because we assume that any hit to the wage bill feeds through all the profit 
measures e.g. firms cannot for example alter their financing costs to offset the wage 
bill rise. With a real interest rate of 3 percent, a pre-tax profit of 6 gives a present 
value of 206.
22
  
Now consider a rise in the minimum wage of 10 percent (the average rise over 
the next four years) that raises the wage bill by 4 percent (column (2)). Assuming no 
offsetting effects, pre-tax profits fall by 12 percent. If this rise in the wage bill is 
permanent (i.e. no subsequent reduction in the minimum wage) and there are no 
offsetting effects, the present value of the firm drops by 12.4 percent to 180.5. 
Alternatively, suppose that the firm takes the hit in full for five years but then 
successfully generates fully offsetting effects elsewhere on the income statement. 
Then firm value declines by 1.6 percent.  
We can also evaluate the size of the response in terms of variable exposure to 
the minimum wage. According to our estimates (reported in Table A4), a firm with a 
10 percent higher share of minimum-wage workers experienced an additional 
estimated 94bp fall in value. In the final column of Table 5, we show that a firm 
employing 40 percent minimum wages workers (10 percentage points above the 
baseline), would experience a decline in present value of 17 percent. Again assuming 
full offset in the medium-run, the drop in firm value is predicted to be 2.3 percent, 
70bp more than for the baseline firm. This closely matches the estimate from our 
empirical analysis. 
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 Averaging over the first half of 2015 (i.e. prior to the Minimum Wage announcement), the nominal 
yield on the Bank of America ML sterling-denominated UK corporate bond index was 3.5%. Given an 
inflation target of 2% that appears well-anchored (given the forward inflation rates implied by the swap 
market), this implies a real rate of 1.5%. We use a somewhat higher nominal yield of 5% (the average 
over the previous five years) to reflect the seemingly abnormally low nominal yields in recent years. 
 
25 
 
Whilst these numbers are inevitably somewhat back-of-the-envelope, they do 
suggest that the size of the effect we have estimated in our empirical work (a 2-3 
percent decline) is consistent with the market believing that firms will be able to 
substantially offset the costs of the minimum wage. Crucially, our estimates appear 
inconsistent with there being a large, permanent effect on firm profits where 
employers are entirely unable to adjust to respond to the additional wage costs 
induced by the minimum wage increase.
23
 The evidence we have reported on 
heterogeneity in the stock market response is supportive of this in that the market 
penalized some firms more than others, with smaller share price falls occurring for 
those that are likely to be more able to adjust (e.g. those facing a smaller wage bill 
shock, or with a higher pre-NLW Lerner index).  
It is clear why firms that face a smaller wage bill shock should be less 
affected. By contrast, it is less clear how to interpret a lower impact for those higher 
pre-NLW Lerner index firms operating in a less competitive environment. One 
possibility is that such firms may be thought to have more organizational slack and so 
have more scope to offset the wage shock through increased efficiencies (Nickell, 
1996). Alternatively, they may be able to reduce rents paid to other workers to offset 
the cost.  
Whilst these are plausible modes of adjustment, as already discussed in 
Section 2 much of the literature has focused on price adjustment in response to 
minimum wages. However, theoretical models of minimum wages and prices are not 
very clear on what kind of scope there is for price adjustment for firms in different 
competitive environments. The fact that our 20 firms are a particular selected group of 
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 They certainly run counter to the observation made in September 2015 by the President of the 
Confederation of British Industry, Paul Drechsler, that “I’ve talked to several chief executives and been 
surprised by the impact on their profits. In one [big] company, it would wipe out all of their profits” 
[Financial Times, September 8 2016].  
26 
 
firms, mostly operating in relatively competitive industries and all with positive profit 
margins, makes it even harder to link the Lerner index findings to particular models 
where price pass through would occur. Because of this ambiguity, and the absence of 
any data on firm-level prices, we next discuss what the firms in our sample actually 
state their possible response to the NLW introduction would be. 
So what do the firms say they will do to actually mitigate the NLW wage bill 
shock in practice? To examine this, we look at corporate reports issued since the 
announcement that have commented on the NLW introduction. At the time of writing, 
nine firms in our sample have released reports that discuss the NLW. The text of 
statements pertaining to the NLW are reported in section C of the Appendix. 
Consideration of the statements make clear two things.  First of all, to varying 
degrees, they all expect to be able to significantly mitigate the effects of the rise in the 
wage bill. Second, the margin of adjustment seems highly unlikely to be employment. 
In fact, none of the nine say they anticipate employment reductions in response to the 
NLW. 
Instead, the nine company statements focus on other margins of adjustment to 
the wage shock that the NLW will induce. Factors mentioned include increasing 
prices, raising productivity and increasing cost efficiency. Most mentioned is the idea 
that the cost increases will be passed on in terms of higher prices (or termed 
inflationary pressure in some of the reports). For example, Next plc (whose half-
yearly report we have referred to above) say that a 1 percent increase in product price 
over the next four years would completely offset their additional wage costs from the 
National Living Wage.  
 
5. Conclusions 
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Based on a stock market event study, the empirical research presented in this paper 
describes what happened to the market value of firms employing minimum wage 
workers when a completely unexpected announcement of raising the minimum wage 
occurred. The setting is an emergency budget that was called promptly after the new 
election of a right of centre government in the UK. The UK Chancellor of the 
Exchequer made a surprise announcement on budget day (July 8 2015) that he would 
introduce a new National Living Wage some 11 percent higher than the prevailing 
National Minimum Wage for workers aged 25 and above. 
 The impact of the announcement is studied both intra-day and for up to ten 
days either side of the announcement. Unlike the work on stock market responses to 
minimum wages in other settings, where the unanticipated nature and certainty of the 
announced rises are much less precise than in our setting, we find there to be a 
significant, though modestly sized, impact on the stock market values of the large 
quoted companies we study. The size of this reduction in firm value resulting from the 
NLW announcement is compared to the fall in profitability in response to the wage 
cost shock that will be induced by the announcement and is seen to be of a 
comparable magnitude, when allowing for firms to adjust so as to mitigate the wage 
bill shock resulting from the minimum wage hike over time. Thus the announcement 
of the NLW introduction had the impact of significantly reducing the expected profits 
of UK publicly-quoted firms prior to its implementation in April 2016.   
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Figure 1:  
Actual and Estimated Minimum Wage Coverage, 1999-2020 
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Notes: Low Pay Commission calculations from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 
from 1999 to 2014 and from 2015 onwards using wage forecasts from ASHE 2014. Paid at or 
below the minimum is based upon the Low Pay Commission procedure of defining a minimum-
wage worker as any worker who receives an hourly wage (excluding overtime) that is up to five 
pence above the minimum wage effective at the time of the survey 
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Figure 2:  
Minimum Wage Shares and Firm Average Wages 
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Notes: The y-axis shows the proportion of minimum-wage workers in the firm. The x-axis 
shows the average annual wage in the firm divided into bins of 5 percentiles from lowest (left) to 
highest (right) – a total of 20 bins for annual wages from £5,000 to £30,000. Derived from 
matched worker-firm data (40,046 workers in 3,684 firms) from the 2013 Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Annual Business Survey (ABS). 
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Figure 3: Examples of Share Price Movements of NMW Firms 
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Figure 4: 
Returns On Budget Day and 24 Hours After The NLW Announcement 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 5:  
Daily Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. Cumulative abnormal returns for the NMW firms are measured using a 2-digit 
industry return index as the expected return measure. The announcement date (Day 0) was 
budget day on July 8 2015, with the announcement A occurring at 13:35, two-thirds of the way 
through the trading day. 
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TABLE 1. AGE VARIATIONS IN MINIMUM WAGES, 2014-2016 
 
 
 
Uprating Date 
 
October 2014 
 
 
October 2015 
 
April 2016 
 
 
Decision Process and Date 
 
Government Accepted 
Low Pay Commission 
Recommendations in 
March 2014 
 
 
Government Accepted 
Low Pay Commission 
Recommendations in 
March 2015 
 
Chancellor Introduced 
National Living Wage 
For 25+ Workers in 
July 2015 Budget 
    
Adult NMW, Age 21+ 6.50 6.70  
Adult NMW, Age 21-24   6.70 
Adult NLW, Age 25+   7.20 
Youth NMW, Age 18-20 5.13 5.30 5.30 
Youth NMW, Age 16-17 3.79 3.87 3.87 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. MINIMUM WAGE SHARES AND FIRM AVERAGE WAGES 
 
       
  Firms with 
Average 
Wage 
≥£15,000 
 
  Firms with 
Average 
Wage 
<£15,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of 
Firms 
 
Mean 
Wage 
 
Share of 
MW 
workers 
 
No of 
Firms 
 
Mean 
Wage 
 
Share of 
MW 
workers 
 
       
All 
 
 
NMW-Intensive 
Sectors 
 
Non-NMW 
Intensive Sectors 
 
4613 
 
 
278 
 
 
4337 
 
 
 
34,986 
 
 
22,446 
 
 
35,789  
0.024 
 
 
0.067 
 
 
0.022 
 
 
1237 
 
 
422 
 
 
817 
 
10,760 
 
 
10,724 
 
 
10,777 
 
 
0.213 
 
 
0.260 
 
 
0.189 
 
 
Notes: Derived from matched worker-firm data (60,990 workers in 5,850 firms) from the 2013 Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Annual Business Survey (ABS). The NMW-Intensive 
Sectors are Retail Trade and Accommodation and Food Serving.  
 
 
  
Notes: From Low Pay Commission annual reports and July 2015 budget. 
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF INTRA-DAY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 Equal-Weighted 
 
Value-Weighted 
 
 
(1) 
Market  
Model   
  
          
(2)  
Industry- 
Matched 
Model 
 
 
(3) 
Market  
Model 
(4) 
Industry- 
Matched  
Model 
 
 
Panel A: NMW Firms – Post-Announcement 
 
CAR(A,20)      -0.342** 
  (0.131) 
 
 -0.271* 
 (0.125) 
    -1.419** 
  (0.551) 
 
   -1.246** 
 (0.537) 
CAR(A,60)      -0.694** 
  (0.238) 
    -0.638** 
(0.242) 
    -1.759** 
 (0.681) 
   -1.564** 
(0.662) 
     
CAR(A,120)   -0.469 
   (0.288) 
 
-0.575 
 (0.312) 
      -1.495** 
   (0.447) 
 
   -1.408** 
 (0.425) 
CAR(A, Market Close)   -0.280 
   (0.323) 
 
 -0.262 
  (0.334) 
   -0.996* 
  (0.495) 
 
-0.815 
 (0.491) 
 
CAR(A, 24 Hours)     -1.300** 
  (0.491) 
    -1.420** 
  (0.519) 
     -2.019** 
  (0.196) 
    -1.997** 
(0.209) 
     
 
Panel B: NMW Firms – Pre-Announcement 
 
CAR(-20,A)  -0.040 
  (0.045) 
 
 -0.121* 
 (0.054) 
 0.034 
 (0.038) 
 
-0.080 
 (0.040) 
CAR(Budget Start, A)  -0.023 
  (0.089) 
 
-0.054 
 (0.093) 
0.149 
 (0.086) 
 
0.086 
(0.075) 
CAR(Market Open, A)  -0.183 
  (0.368) 
 
   0.038 
   (0.363) 
 -0.164 
  (0.159) 
 
0.298 
(0.139) 
CAR(24 Hours, A)  -0.103 
  (0.313) 
  -0.279 
   (0.334) 
 -0.280 
   (0.201) 
-0.365 
         (0.212) 
     
        
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: CAR(A, Y) denotes the cumulative abnormal return from announcement time A (13:35) to minute 
Y relative to the announcement time. There are 20 firms in the NMW sample. Panel A reports results for 
the post-announcement period and Panel B reports results for the pre-announcement period. The market 
closed 175 minutes after the announcement, it opened 334 minutes before the announcement and the 
budget began 62 minutes before the announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each firm is equal-
weighted in columns (1) and (2) and weighted by their share of the total value of all trades in NMW stocks 
over the relevant period in columns (3) and (4).  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF FIVE-DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
 
(1) 
          
(2)  
 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
NMW    -2.131* 
  (0.895) 
 
  -2.331* 
 (0.943) 
    -2.266* 
   (1.032) 
 
  
NMW High Wage 
Bill Shock 
     
 
     
 
     
 
  -4.077* 
 (1.736) 
 
      
NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock 
 
      -0.792 
  (0.968) 
 
 
NMW Low Lerner 
Index 
    -3.868* 
(1.722) 
      
NMW High Lerner 
Index 
 
    -0.741 
(0.965) 
Average Wage £15-
20k 
     
 
 -0.196 
  (0.909) 
 
-0.215 
 (0.892) 
-0.158 
(0.897) 
Average Wage £20-
25k 
     0.262 
  (0.567) 
 
 0.285 
 (0.566) 
0.325 
(0.566) 
Average Wage £25-
30k 
    0.291 
 (0.899) 
 
0.273 
(0.900) 
0.334 
(0.902) 
      
R
2
 0.011 0.220 0.221 0.225 0.225 
Sample Size 442 442 442 442 442 
2-Digit Industry N Y Y Y Y 
5-Day Prior Return N Y Y Y Y 
Size Quintiles N Y Y 
 
Y Y 
        
 
   
 
 
 
        
 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the five-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,5), using the CAPM 
model. NMW are our sample of 20 firms with average wage less than £15,000. NMW High Wage Bill 
Shock are the 10 NMW firms with the highest wage bill as a percentage of total cost. NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock are the other ten firms in the NMW sample. NMW Low Lerner Index are the 10 NMW firms 
with the lowest gross profit margins and NMW High Lerner Index are the other ten firms in the NMW 
sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We also control for foreign exposure with a dummy equal 
to one if the majority of firm employment (or sales) is outside the UK.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 5. THE NATIONAL LIVING WAGE EFFECT ON FIRM PROFITS   
 
 
  
Baseline Firm 
 
10 Percent Increase in 
Minimum Wage  
(30 Percent Minimum  
Wage Workers) 
 
 
10 Percent Increase in 
Minimum Wage  
(40 Percent Minimum 
Wage Workers)  
    
Sales 100 100 100 
Wage Bill 18.6 19.3 19.6 
Other Costs 53.9 53.9 53.9 
Gross Profit 27.5 26.8 26.5 
Operating Profit 8.7 8.0 7.7 
Pre-Tax Profit 6.0 5.3 5.0 
    
Present Value of Pre-Tax Profits 206 180.5 170.9 
    
Percent Decline in Firm Value 
(Permanent) 
 -12.4 -17.0 
    
Decline in Firm Value (Hit to 2020, 
Thereafter No Effect) 
 -1.6 -2.3 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Column 2 assumes a 3 percent real interest rate, 4 percent rise in wage bill (resulting from a 10 
percent minimum wage increase, assuming 30 percent of workers are NMW workers). Column 3 
assumes a 5.5 percent rise in the wage bill (resulting from a 10 percent minimum wage increase, 
assuming 40 percent of workers are NMW workers). If, rather than a 10 percent increase, the minimum 
wage increase is graduated as a path of 7 percent, 9 percent, 11 percent and 12 percent increases to get to 
the £9.00 per hour target in 2020, the calculation turns out to be almost identical. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix gives details on: the named NMW firms we study; the 2015 budget 
measures; statements about the NLW made by companies in our sample in their 
company accounts; Tables and Figures containing additional results. 
 
A. List of National Minimum Wage Firms By Sector 
 
Bars and Restaurants 
 
Greene King plc 
J D Wetherspoon plc 
Marston’s plc 
Mitchells & Butlers plc 
The Restaurant Group plc 
 
Retail 
 
Apparel 
Next plc  
 
Broadline 
B&M European Value Retail 
Debenhams plc 
Marks and Spencer Group plc 
Home Retail Group plc 
 
Food 
McColl’s Retail Group plc 
WM Morrison Supermarkets plc 
Greggs plc 
 
Home Improvement 
Dunelm Group plc 
 
Specialty 
Card Factory plc 
Game Digital plc 
Poundland Group plc 
WH Smith plc 
 
Services 
 
Business Support 
Mitie Group plc 
 
Recreational 
Cineworld Group plc 
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B. Budget 2015 Measures 
 
In addition to the National Living Wage announcement, the budget contained the 
following measures (HM Treasury, 2015): 
 
1. A rise in the tax-free personal allowance from £10,600 (2015/16) to £11,000 
(2016/17). 
2. Raising the threshold for higher-rate marginal income tax from £42,385 
(2015/16) to £43,000 (2016/17). 
3. Removing the family home from inheritance tax liability. 
4. Reducing the tax-free amount of pension contributions for those earning more 
than £150,000. 
5. Eliminating the ability of individuals to permanently claim non-domicile 
status for tax purposes. 
6. Reforming the welfare system by (a) freezing many benefits in nominal terms 
for four years, (b) reducing the cap on household total benefit claims to 
£20,000 per year, (c) requiring 18-21 year olds claiming benefit to move on to 
an apprenticeship or start work within 6 months of claiming. 
7. A real terms increase in the Defence budget for the remainder of the 
Parliament. 
8. Reforming dividend tax credit to favour those with smaller dividend income. 
9. The main rate of corporation tax will be cut to 19% in 2017 and 18% in 2020. 
10. Annual investment allowance confirmed at £200,000 per year. 
11. A rise in employment allowance (from £2,000 to £3,000), which provides an 
offset to employer national insurance contributions. 
12. Insurance premium tax rises from 6% to 9.5%. 
13. Restricting tax relief for wealthier landlords. 
14. Reforming the taxation of banks with a gradual move toward taxing profits 
rather than balance-sheet size. 
15. A levy of 0.5% (from 2018) on all firms paybill to fund 3 million new 
apprenticeships.  
16. 30 hours of free childcare for 3 and 4 year olds from 2017 – increased from 15 
hours. 
17. Student maintenance grants to be replaced with loans. 
18. Reform of the road tax system. 
19. Public sector pay increases limited to 1% per annum for the next four years. 
20. A crackdown on tax evasion and non-compliance. 
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C. Firm Responses to NLW 
 
Up to April 2016, the following nine companies in the sample we study have 
published half-year or full-year company accounts, including statements about the 
National Living Wage: 
 
1). Next plc  
 
Half-year results, 10 September 2015 
 
“NEXT’s total UK wages, at circa £600m, represent 15% of our sales. Of these, about 
£100m relates to those who would qualify for the NLW. Our adult starter rate will 
already be £7.04, so the increase to £7.20 in 2016 is manageable. We estimate the cost 
of implementing the NLW next year will be £2m. 
 
Looking beyond 2016, we estimate that the cost of the further rises in the NLW to 
2020, over and above the rate of general wage inflation, will be £27m per annum. Of 
this, £11m relates to the wages of those who will be paid the NLW. The remaining 
£16m is the knock-on effect of maintaining wage differentials for supervisors, junior 
managers and other more skilled or demanding roles within the business (such as 
specialist call centre work). 
 
The £27m additional NLW cost is not immaterial but, in the context of NEXT’s wider 
cost base, is not transformative. We estimate that we would need to increase prices by 
around 1% to compensate for this cost which, taken over four years, is unlikely to 
have a material effect on the trading performance of the business. It should be noted 
that this is probably a pessimistic view of the required price rise, as we have assumed 
no improvements in productivity. In reality, we hope to be able to compensate for 
some wage inflation through increased productivity measures throughout the 
business.” 
 
2). Debenhams plc 
 
Full-year results, 22 October 2015. 
 
Cash impact £3m in FY2016, £8m in FY2017 (total wage bill = £345m). Both 
estimates include the cost of maintaining pay differentials.  
 
“We anticipate that in the context of our continuing investment in systems and 
infrastructure and our focus on operational effectiveness, productivity gains will 
mitigate the majority of this impact on our P&L in these years” 
 
3). Marks and Spencer Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 4 November 2015 
 
“The new NLW rate will be £7.20 per hour effective from 1 April 2016, and as our 
permanent customer assistant rate is already £7.41, we do not expect any short term 
impact on our staffing costs”. 
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4). Home Retail Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 21 October 2015 
 
“It is anticipated that, without any actions to mitigate the increases in wages 
attributable to the new NLW, the associated FY17 group cost increase would be 
around £15m.” (total wage bill = £581m). “The Group will look at all opportunities to 
mitigate an element of this NLW cost increase through its existing operational 
excellence cost efficiency programmes.” 
 
5). WM Morrison Supermarkets plc 
 
Full-year results, 10 March 2016. 
 
“In September we announced an increase in hourly pay for in-store colleagues, to 
£8.20 from a previous minimum of £6.83. We are recognizing the contribution of our 
excellent and dedicated colleagues, who are fundamental to the Morrisons turnaround. 
As announced, the extra investment will be £40m, and more than 90,000 staff will 
benefit across all age brackets. The new rate is £1 per hour above the National Living 
Wage that is to be introduced from April 2016” (total wage bill = £1.728bn). 
 
6). Greggs plc 
 
Half-year results, 29 July 2015 
 
“The proposed increases to the minimum wage are likely to drive inflationary 
pressure in the broader sector over the coming years. We have consistently paid rates 
of pay above this level, with our standard rate for hourly-paid shop staff at £7.11, 
currently nine per cent higher than the national minimum wage. We are assessing the 
medium-term impact of further increases on our business” 
 
7). Poundland Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 19 November 2015. 
 
“Although Poundland is not a minimum wage employer, we need to maintain pay 
differentials when new rates are introduced. Without mitigation, the increase in wages 
attributable to the new NLW is estimated at £4.3m in the 2017 financial year” 
 
“We are mitigating this additional cost. We have accelerated investment in the current 
year in productivity including the trial of hybrid self-scanning checkouts, new sales 
based ordering systems, shelf ready packaging, the installation of LED lighting and 
other operational measures. We will spend an additional £2m this year in these areas, 
as we seek to fully mitigate the additional costs of the NLW.” 
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8). WH Smith plc 
 
Full-year results, 15 October 2015. 
 
“In July, the government announced the introduction of the NLW from April 2016. 
We anticipate the impact of it in the 2015/16 financial year to be slightly over £1m for 
the Group, with around two-thirds of the cost impacting the High Street business. 
While identifying the impact is complex, we have calculated that without any actions 
to offset the impact, the additional annual cost across the Group would be around £2-
3m, or around 0.5% of the Group’s total cost base each year. As with all inflationary 
pressures, we will look to offset these increases through our existing pipeline of 
initiatives, as well as identifying further opportunities for improved productivity and 
efficiency.” (total wage bill = £189m). 
 
9). Mitie Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 23 November 2015 
 
“We are positive about this move [introduction of NLW], which ensures that those of 
our people who are affected, are better rewarded and feel more motivated to do the 
jobs they do. It will also improve retention rates across our business.” 
 
“The areas of our business that are impacted by this change are single service 
contracts in cleaning, a small area of security, catering and healthcare. One third of 
the contracts in these areas of the business come up for re-tender each year, and all 
work bid or re-bid since July 2015 onwards has factored in the NLW increases. Many 
contracts in the group have wage rates above this level”. 
 
“We also believe that this is an important move for the outsourcing industry, as it 
affects all competitors equally and creates a level playing field in terms of bidding. 
We do expect outsourcing prices to increase in the future and will not be advocating 
job cuts in reaction to this change. However we will continue to work with clients to 
identify cost efficiencies in other areas.” 
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D. Additional Tables 
 
 
TABLE A1.  ESTIMATES OF MEAN DAILY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
(1) 
CAPM Model   
  
          
(2) 
4-Factor Model 
 
 
 
(3) 
Industry-Matched 
Model  
 
 
Panel A: NMW Firms – Post-Announcement 
 
CAR(A,1)    -1.428** 
 (0.523) 
 
   -1.516** 
 (0.542) 
   -1.693** 
 (0.564) 
CAR(A,2)   -1.799**   -1.967**   -2.465** 
 (0.608) (0.620) (0.709) 
    
CAR(A,3)   -1.661**   -1.823**   -2.553** 
 (0.617) (0.612) (0.660) 
    
CAR(A,4)  -1.533* -1.639*   -2.774** 
 (0.656) (0.656) (0.773) 
    
CAR(A,5)   -2.131* 
 (0.917) 
 -2.231* 
(0.910) 
   -3.047** 
(1.235) 
    
CAR(A,10)   -2.268* 
 (1.128) 
 
 -2.464* 
(1.165) 
   -3.241** 
(1.370) 
 
Panel B: NMW Firms – Pre-Announcement 
 
  
CAR(-1,A) -0.327 
 (0.512) 
 
-0.357 
 (0.533) 
-0.368 
 (0.520) 
CAR(-5,A)   0.500 
  (0.800) 
0.402 
(0.805) 
 
0.767 
(0.832) 
 
CAR(-10,A)  1.647 
 (0.934) 
 
1.523 
(0.963) 
0.768 
(0.904) 
    
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: CAR(A, Y) denotes the cumulative abnormal return from announcement time on July 8th (A) to 
close on day Y, where Y is relative to 8
th
 July. There are 20 firms in the NMW sample. Panel A reports 
results for the post-announcement period and Panel B reports results for the pre-announcement period.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A2. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF DAILY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 
 
 
(1) 
CAPM Model   
  
          
(2)  
4-Factor Model 
 
 
 
(3) 
Industry-matched 
Model 
 
    
Mean    -2.131* 
  (0.917) 
 -2.231* 
(0.910) 
   -3.047** 
(1.235) 
    
Median   -1.148* 
  (0.563) 
  -1.358** 
(0.510) 
 -2.213* 
(1.125) 
 
Trimmed Mean     -1.343** 
  (0.394) 
  -1.392** 
(0.395) 
 
    -2.444** 
 (0.658) 
 
Negative Return Count   15* 
(5, 14) 
  15* 
(5, 14) 
  15* 
(4, 14) 
 
    
          
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Estimates are for the five-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,5) for the NMW stocks. The 
trimmed mean excludes the two largest and two smallest returns. Negative Return Count is the number 
of stocks (out of 20) that have a negative five-day CAR (with the empirical 95 percent confidence 
interval below). ** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A3. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF TEN-DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
 
(1) 
          
(2)  
 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
NMW    -2.268* 
  (1.101) 
 
  -2.540* 
 (1.136) 
    -2.676* 
   (1.220) 
 
  
NMW High Wage 
Bill Shock 
     
 
     
 
     
 
  -4.723* 
 (1.995) 
 
      
NMW Low Wage Bill 
Shock 
 
      -1.001 
  (1.242) 
 
 
NMW Low Lerner 
Index 
    -4.945* 
(2.064) 
      
NMW High Lerner 
Index 
    -0.518 
(1.050) 
      
Average Wage £15-
20k 
     
 
 -0.321 
  (1.012) 
 
-0.334 
 (1.005) 
-0.269 
(1.010) 
Average Wage £20-
25k 
   -0.934 
  (0.751) 
 
-0.903 
 (0.749) 
-0.842 
(0.750) 
Average Wage £25-
30k 
    0.615 
 (1.115) 
 
0.601 
(1.117) 
0.676 
(1.116) 
R
2 
0.021 0.267 0.271 0.275 0.277 
Sample Size 442 442 442 442 442 
2-Digit Industry N Y Y Y Y 
10-Day Prior Return N Y Y Y Y 
Size Quintiles N Y Y 
 
Y Y 
        
 
   
 
 
 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the ten-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,10), using the CAPM 
model. NMW are our sample of 20 firms with average wage less than £15,000. NMW High Wage Bill 
Shock are the 10 NMW firms with the highest wage bill as a percentage of total cost. NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock are the other ten firms in the NMW sample. NMW Low Lerner Index are the 10 NMW firms 
with the lowest gross profit margins and NMW High Lerner Index are the other ten firms in the NMW 
sample. We also control for foreign exposure with a dummy equal to one if the majority of firm 
employment (or sales) is outside the UK. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A4. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
       
  Five-Day 
CAR 
  Ten-Day 
CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
       
NMW Sample 
 
 
 
NMW Exposure 
 
 
 
R
2 
Sample Size 
2-Digit Industry 
5-Day Prior Return 
Size Quintiles 
  -2.773** 
(1.071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     0.303 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 -9.370* 
(4.571) 
 
 
0.296 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
-2.318* 
(1.080) 
 
 
  -5.789 
(4.499) 
 
 
0.308 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
-2.848* 
(1.327) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.348 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
  -13.512* 
    (5.288) 
 
 
       0.352 
        299 
          Y 
          Y 
          Y 
-2.059 
 (1.309) 
 
 
-10.355* 
(5.229) 
 
 
0.357 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Notes: From ASHE and ABS sample. The sample size is 299 of the original 442 firms (with 22,304 
workers) as we lose firms for two key reasons. First, some firms are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange but the holding company is not UK-domiciled. These firms do not appear in the ABS as the 
sampling frame is only UK-registered companies. We lose 99 companies as a result. Second, as the 
ASHE wage data is only a 1 percent sample, some firms do not have any workers recorded in the data. 
The dependent variables are the five- (and ten-) day cumulative abnormal return using the CAPM 
model. NMW Exposure is the percentage of workers in the firm that earn within 5p on the National 
Minimum Wage in the ASHE sample for the firm. NMW Sample is a dummy variable for those of our 
sample of 20 NMW firms with average wage less than £15,000. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
24
 
 
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
24
 We also experimented with a wage-gap measure that estimates for each firm the rise in the wage bill 
implied by simply increasing the hourly wage of all those aged 25 and over up to the new £7.20 level. 
The estimated coefficients (se) were -41.654 (22.926) and -64.515 (26.002) for the five- and ten-day 
results respectively. The mean of this wage-gap measure is 0.005 for all firms and 0.030 for the 
minimum wage sample. 
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E. Additional Figures 
 
 
Figure A1:  
Gap in Returns On Budget Day and 24 Hours After The NLW Announcement 
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Open Close/Open
-2
.2
-1
.8
-1
.4
-1
-.
6
-.
2
.2
.6
1
1
.4
In
d
e
x
 =
 0
 a
t 
N
L
W
 A
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t 
T
im
e
8:00 13:35 16:30/8:00 13:34
 
NMW/Non-NMW Gap 95% CI
Time of Day
Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure A2:  
Frequency Distribution of Abnormal Returns From May 1 to Budget Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
NLW Budget Day 13:35 to 13:34
Previous 46 Days 13:35 to 13:34
Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
